IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy

  • Javier Bianchi
  • Enrique G. Mendoza

Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not internalize how borrowing decisions taken in “good times” affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that agents in a competitive equilibrium borrow more than a financial regulator who internalizes this externality. We also find, however, that under commitment the regulator's plans are time-inconsistent, and hence focus on studying optimal, time-consistent policy without commitment. This policy features a state-contingent macroprudential debt tax that is strictly positive at date t if a crisis has positive probability at t + 1. Quantitatively, this policy reduces sharply the frequency and magnitude of crises, removes fat tails from the distribution of returns, and increases social welfare. In contrast, constant debt taxes are ineffective and can be welfare-reducing, while an optimized “macroprudential Taylor rule” is effective but less so than the optimal policy.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at Free access is also available to older working papers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19704.

in new window

Date of creation: Dec 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19704
Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2007. "Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 1702-1725, September.
  2. Emmanuel Farhi & Ivan Werning, 2012. "Dealing with the Trilemma: Optimal Capital Controls with Fixed Exchange Rates," NBER Working Papers 18199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
  4. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2010. "Managing Credit Booms and Busts: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," NBER Working Papers 16377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. John Y. Campbell, 2002. "Consumption-Based Asset Pricing," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1974, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Enrique Mendoza & Emine Boz, 2010. "Financial Innovation, the Discovery of Risk, and the U.S. Credit Crisis," 2010 Meeting Papers 316, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Julia K. Thomas & Aubhik Khan, 2010. "Credit Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an Economy with Production Heterogeneity," 2010 Meeting Papers 801, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Enrique G. Mendoza & Marco E. Terrones, 2008. "An anatomy of credit booms: evidence from macro aggregates and micro data," International Finance Discussion Papers 936, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  9. Mehra, Rajnish & Prescott, Edward C., 2003. "The equity premium in retrospect," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 889-938 Elsevier.
  10. Bianchi, Javier, 2009. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," MPRA Paper 16270, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Aiyagari, S.R. & Gertler, M., 1998. ""Overreaction" of Asset Prices in General Equilibrium," Working Papers 98-25, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  12. Vincenzo Quadrini & Fabrizio Perri, 2011. "International Recessions," 2011 Meeting Papers 123, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2013. "Financial crises and macro-prudential policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 453-470.
  14. Javier Bianchi & Emine Boz & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2012. "Macro-prudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation," IMF Working Papers 12/181, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 1999. "Quantitative asset pricing implications of endogenous solvency constraints," Working Papers 99-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  16. Vincenzo Quadrini & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2010. "Financial Globalization, Financial Crises and Contagion," 2010 Meeting Papers 841, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Karsten Jeske, 2006. "Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 576-593, June.
  18. Enrique Mendoza & Javier Bianchi, 2010. "Overborrowing, financial crises and ‘macro-prudential’ taxes," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct.
  19. Ricardo Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2000. "International and Domestic Collateral Constraints in a Model of Emerging Market Crises," NBER Working Papers 7971, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Kristin J. Forbes & Francis E. Warnock, 2011. "Capital Flow Waves: Surges, Stops, Flight, and Retrenchment," NBER Chapters, in: Global Financial Crisis National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Urban Jermann & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2012. "Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 238-71, February.
  22. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  23. John Moore & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, . "Credit Cycles," Discussion Papers 1995-5, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  24. John Heaton & Deborah Lucas, 1993. "Evaluating the Effects of Incomplete Markets on Risk Sharing and Asset Pricing," NBER Working Papers 4249, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Paul Klein & Per Krusell & José-V�ctor R�os-Rull, 2008. "Time-Consistent Public Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 789-808.
  26. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2012. "Prudential Policy for Peggers," NBER Working Papers 18031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 865-88, October.
  28. New York University & Saki Bigio, 2010. "Endogenous Liquidity and the Business Cycle," 2010 Meeting Papers 672, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  29. Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 2012. "Prudential Policy for Peggers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Uribe, Martin & Yue, Vivian Z., 2006. "Country spreads and emerging countries: Who drives whom?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 6-36, June.
  31. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
  32. Boissay, Frederic & Collard, Fabrice & Smets, Frank, 2013. "Booms and systemic banking crises," Working Paper Series 1514, European Central Bank.
  33. Enrique G. Mendoza & Katherine A. Smith, 2004. "Quantitative Implication of A Debt-Deflation Theory of Sudden Stops and Asset Prices," NBER Working Papers 10940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  34. Korinek, Anton, 2011. "Systemic risk-taking: amplification effects, externalities, and regulatory responses," Working Paper Series 1345, European Central Bank.
  35. repec:fth:starer:98-25 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Alan C. Stockman & Linda L. Tesar, 1990. "Tastes and Technology in a Two-Country Model of the Business Cycle: Explaining International Comovements," NBER Working Papers 3566, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Linda S. Goldberg & José Manuel Campa, 2010. "The Sensitivity of the CPI to Exchange Rates: Distribution Margins, Imported Inputs, and Trade Exposure," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 392-407, May.
  38. Mulligan, Casey B, 1997. "Scale Economies, the Value of Time, and the Demand for Money: Longitudinal Evidence from Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1061-79, October.
  39. Zhiguo He & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2013. "Intermediary Asset Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 732-70, April.
  40. repec:fth:starer:9825 is not listed on IDEAS
  41. Coleman, Wilbur John, II, 1990. "Solving the Stochastic Growth Model by Policy-Function Iteration," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 8(1), pages 27-29, January.
  42. Guido Lorenzoni, 2007. "Inefficient Credit Booms," NBER Working Papers 13639, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  43. Enrique G. Mendoza, 2010. "Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1941-66, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19704. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.