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Prudential Policy for Peggers


  • Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe
  • Martin Uribe


This paper shows that in a small open economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity pegging the nominal exchange rate creates a negative pecuniary externality. This peg-induced externality is shown to cause unemployment, overborrowing, and depressed levels of consumption. The paper characterizes the optimal capital control policy in this model and shows that it is prudential in nature. For it restricts capital inflows in good times and subsidizes external borrowing in bad times. Under plausible calibrations of the model, this type of macro prudential policy is shown to lower the average unemployment rate by 10 percentage points, reduce average external debt by more than 50 percent, and increase welfare by over 7 percent of consumption per period.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2012. "Prudential Policy for Peggers," NBER Working Papers 18031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18031
    Note: EFG IFM ME

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3400-3426, December.
    2. Arnaud Costinot & Guido Lorenzoni & Iván Werning, 2014. "A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(1), pages 77-128.
    3. Martín Uribe, 2006. "Individual Versus Aggregate Collateral Constraints and the Overborrowing Syndrome," NBER Working Papers 12260, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2011. "Revisiting Overborrowing and its Policy Implications," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.), Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 6, pages 145-184 Central Bank of Chile.
    5. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
    6. Roberto Garcia-Saltos & Leonardo Auernheimer, 2000. "International Debt and the Price of Domestic Assets," IMF Working Papers 00/177, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia, 2011. "Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence: An Overview," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.), Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 1, pages 001-021 Central Bank of Chile.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Chang & Andrés Velasco, 2017. "Financial Frictions and Unconventional Monetary Policy in Emerging Economies," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 65(1), pages 154-191, April.
    2. Davis, J. Scott & Presno, Ignacio, 2017. "Capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in a small open economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 114-130.
    3. Mendicino, Caterina & Punzi, Maria Teresa, 2014. "House prices, capital inflows and macroprudential policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 337-355.
    4. Akram, Gilal Muhammad & Byrne, Joseph P., 2015. "Foreign exchange market pressure and capital controls," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 42-53.
    5. Gianluca Benigno & Luca Fornaro, 2014. "The Financial Resource Curse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(1), pages 58-86, January.
    6. Mitchener, Kris James & Wandschneider, Kirsten, 2015. "Capital controls and recovery from the financial crisis of the 1930s," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 188-201.
    7. Davis, Scott & Presno, Ignacio, 2014. "Capital controls as an instrument of monetary policy," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 171, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    8. Michael B. Devereux & James Yetman, 2014. "Capital Controls, Global Liquidity Traps, and the International Policy Trilemma," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(1), pages 158-189, January.
    9. Jeanne, Olivier, 2013. "Macroprudential policies in a global perspective," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov, pages 1-38.
    10. Carlos Hurtado, 2012. "The Euro Experience: A Review of the Euro Crisis, Policy Issues, Issues Going Forward and Policy Implications for Latin America," Research Department Publications 4786, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    11. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2013. "Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy," NBER Working Papers 19704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Michaud, Amanda & Rothert, Jacek, 2014. "Optimal borrowing constraints and growth in a small open economy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 326-340.
    13. repec:spr:joecth:v:63:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0975-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Michael W. Klein & Jay C. Shambaugh, 2015. "Rounding the Corners of the Policy Trilemma: Sources of Monetary Policy Autonomy," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 33-66, October.
    15. D. Filiz Unsal, 2013. "Capital Flows and Financial Stability: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Responses," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(1), pages 233-285, March.
    16. Eric Young & Alessandro Rebucci & Christopher Otrok, 2013. "Capital Controls or Real Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective," 2013 Meeting Papers 641, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew, 2014. "Capital Controls in the 21st Century," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(PA), pages 1-16.
    18. Alfred Duncan & Charles Nolan, 2015. "Objectives and Challenges of Macroprudential Policy," Working Papers 2015_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    19. Lorenzoni, Guido, 2014. "International Financial Crises," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier.
    20. Javier Bianchi, 2012. "Comment on "Capital Account Policies and the Real Exchange Rate"," NBER Chapters,in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012, pages 43-48 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Anton Korinek, 2017. "Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View," NBER Working Papers 24152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Mitsuru Katagiri & Ryo Kato & Takayuki Tsuruga, 2017. "Prudential capital controls or bailouts? The impact of different collateral constraint assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 943-960, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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