IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedlwp/2012-025.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Capital controls or exchange rate policy? a pecuniary externality perspective

Author

Abstract

In the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, a new policy paradigm has emerged> in which old-fashioned policies such as capital controls and other government distor-> tions have become part of the standard policy toolkit (the so-called macro-prudential> policies). On the wave of this seemingly unanimous policy consensus, a new strand> of theoretical literature contends that capital controls are welfare enhancing and can> be justi ed rigorously because of second-best considerations. Within the same the-> oretical framework adopted in this fast-growing literature, we show that a credible> commitment to support the exchange rate in crisis times always welfare-dominates> prudential capital controls as it can achieve the rst best unconstrained allocation.> In this benchmark economy, prudential capital controls are optimal only when the set> of policy tools is restricted so that they are the only policy instrument available.

Suggested Citation

  • Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric Young, 2012. "Capital controls or exchange rate policy? a pecuniary externality perspective," Working Papers 2012-025, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2012-025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-025.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3400-3426, December.
    2. Edwards, Sebastian & Frankel, Jeffrey A. (ed.), 2002. "Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226184944, November.
    3. Nicolas E. Magud & Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2018. "Capital Controls: Myth and Reality--A Portfolio Balance Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 1-47, May.
    4. Bianca De Paoli & Anna Lipinska, 2012. "Capital controls: a normative analysis," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov, pages 1-36.
    5. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2013. "Financial crises and macro-prudential policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 453-470.
    6. Bruce Ian Carlin & Shaun William Davies & Andrew Miles Iannaccone, 2010. "Competing for Attention in Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 16085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(4), pages 865-888.
    8. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2011. "Revisiting Overborrowing and its Policy Implications," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 6, pages 145-184, Central Bank of Chile.
    9. Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia, 2011. "Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence: An Overview," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 1, pages 001-021, Central Bank of Chile.
    10. Enrique G. Mendoza, 2002. "Credit, Prices, and Crashes: Business Cycles with a Sudden Stop," NBER Chapters, in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 335-392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Arnaud Costinot & Guido Lorenzoni & Iván Werning, 2014. "A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(1), pages 77-128.
    12. Paul Krugman, 1999. "Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(4), pages 459-472, November.
    13. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2010. "Overborrowing, financial crises and ‘macro-prudential’ taxes," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct.
    14. Enrique G. Mendoza, 2010. "Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1941-1966, December.
    15. Nicolas Magud & Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, 2005. "Capital Controls: Myth and Reality A Portfolio Balance Approach to Capital Controls," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2006-10, University of Oregon Economics Department.
    16. Sebastian Edwards & Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2002. "Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number edwa02-2, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Javier Bianchi & Chenxin Liu & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2016. "Fundamentals News, Global Liquidity, and Macroprudential Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Choi, Woo Jin & Taylor, Alan M., 2022. "Precaution versus mercantilism: Reserve accumulation, capital controls, and the real exchange rate," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    3. Stephanie Guichard, 2017. "10 Years after the Global Financial Crisis: What Have We Learnt About International Capital Flows?," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(03), pages 1-30, October.
    4. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2023. "Optimal Policy for Macrofinancial Stability," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 401-428, October.
    5. Andrés Fernández & Michael W Klein & Alessandro Rebucci & Martin Schindler & Martín Uribe, 2016. "Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 64(3), pages 548-574, August.
    6. Gianluca Benigno & Luca Fornaro, 2014. "The Financial Resource Curse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(1), pages 58-86, January.
    7. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2013. "Financial crises and macro-prudential policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 453-470.
    8. Anton Korinek, 2017. "Currency wars or efficient spillovers?," BIS Working Papers 615, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Tack Yun, 2012. "Recent Issues in Emerging-Economies Macroeconomics," CAEPR Working Papers 2013-001, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    10. Anton Korinek, 2016. "Currency Wars or Efficient Spillovers? A General Theory of International Policy Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 23004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Seoane, Hernán D. & Yurdagul, Emircan, 2019. "Trend shocks and sudden stops," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    12. Juan M. Hernandez & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2017. "Optimal v. simple financial policy rules in a production economy with “liability dollarization," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 35(82), pages 25-39, April.
    13. Mitsuru Katagiri & Ryo Kato & Takayuki Tsuruga, 2013. "Prudential Capital Controls: The Impact of Different Collateral Constraint Assumptions," Discussion papers e-12-014, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
    14. Timothy J. Kehoe & Kim J. Ruhl & Joe Steinberg, 2013. "What will happen when foreigners stop lending to the United States?," Economic Policy Paper 13-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    15. Choi, Jae Hoon, 2020. "Capital controls and foreign exchange market intervention," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    16. Tack Yun, 2013. "Recent Issues in Emerging-economies Macroeconomics," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(2), pages 285-302, June.
    17. Andrés Fernández & Alessandro Rebucci & Martín Uribe, 2013. "Are Capital Controls Prudential? An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 19671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Brendon, Charles, 2016. "COEURE Survey: Fiscal and Monetary Policies after the Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 11088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Arana, Rumile & Ramirez, Francisco A. & Wright, Allan, 2017. "Credit Risks and Monetary Policy within Caribbean Economies," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 8268, Inter-American Development Bank.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2016. "Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 147-165.
    2. Eric Young & Alessandro Rebucci & Christopher Otrok, 2013. "Capital Controls or Real Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective," 2013 Meeting Papers 641, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2013. "Financial crises and macro-prudential policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 453-470.
    4. Mr. Anton Korinek, 2011. "The New Economics of Capital Controls Imposed for Prudential Reasons+L4888," IMF Working Papers 2011/298, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Anton Korinek & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2013. "From Sudden Stops to Fisherian Deflation: Quantitative Theory and Policy Implications," NBER Working Papers 19362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Korinek, Anton & Sandri, Damiano, 2016. "Capital controls or macroprudential regulation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(S1), pages 27-42.
    7. Korinek, Anton, 2018. "Regulating capital flows to emerging markets: An externality view," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 61-80.
    8. Javier Bianchi & Guido Lorenzoni, 2021. "The Prudential Use of Capital Controls and Foreign Currency Reserves," Working Papers 787, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    9. Andrés Fernández & Alessandro Rebucci & Martín Uribe, 2013. "Are Capital Controls Prudential? An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 19671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Alessandro Rebucci & Chang Ma, 2019. "Capital Controls: A Survey of the New Literature," NBER Working Papers 26558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2023. "Optimal Policy for Macrofinancial Stability," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 401-428, October.
    12. Norring, Anni, 2022. "Taming the tides of capital: Review of capital controls and macroprudential policy in emerging economies," BoF Economics Review 1/2022, Bank of Finland.
    13. Nicolas E. Magud & Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2018. "Capital Controls: Myth and Reality--A Portfolio Balance Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 1-47, May.
    14. Julian A. Parra-Polania & Carmiña O. Vargas, 2015. "Macroprudential vs. Ex-post Policy Interventions: when Domestic Taxes are Relevant for International Lenders," Borradores de Economia 12698, Banco de la Republica.
    15. Miguel Acosta-Henao & Laura Alfaro & Andrés Fernández, 2020. "Sticky Capital Controls," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 877, Central Bank of Chile.
    16. Hewei Shen, 2016. "Financial Crises and the Role of Debt Maturity for Emerging Economies," CAEPR Working Papers 2017-012, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    17. Pierri, Damian Rene & Reffett, Kevin, 2021. "Memory, multiple equilibria and emerging market crises," UC3M Working papers. Economics 32871, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    18. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2017. "Adjustment to small, large, and sunspot shocks in open economies with stock collateral constraints," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República, vol. 35(82), pages 2-9, April.
    19. Gianluca Benigno & Luca Fornaro, 2014. "The Financial Resource Curse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(1), pages 58-86, January.
    20. J. Scott Davis & Michael B. Devereux, 2019. "Capital Controls as Macro-prudential Policy in a Large Open Economy," NBER Working Papers 25710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign exchange rates; Capital market;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • F37 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2012-025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anna Oates (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbslus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.