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The “mystery of the printing press” monetary policy and self-fulfilling debt crises

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  • Corsetti, Giancarlo
  • Dedola, Luca

Abstract

We study the mechanism by which unconventional (balance-sheet) monetary policy can rule out self-fulfilling sovereign default in a model with optimizing but discretionary fiscal and monetary policymakers. By purchasing sovereign debt, the central bank e§ectively swaps risky government paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk, thus yielding a lower interest rate. We characterize a critical threshold for central bank purchases beyond which, absent fundamental fiscal stress, the government strictly prefers primary surplus adjustment to default. Since default may still occur for fundamental reasons, however, the central bank faces the risk of losses on sovereign debt holdings, which may generate ine¢cient inflation. This risk does not undermine the credibility of a backstop, nor the ability of a central bank to pursue its inflation objectives when the latter enjoys fiscal backing or fiscal authorities are su¢ciently averse to inflation.

Suggested Citation

  • Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dedola, Luca, 2014. "The “mystery of the printing press” monetary policy and self-fulfilling debt crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86333, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:86333
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    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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