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The sovereign default puzzle: Modelling issues and lessons for Europe

  • Daniel Cohen

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics)

  • Sébastien Villemot

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics)

Why do countries default? this seemingly simple question has yet to be adequately answered in the literature. Indeed, prevailing modelling strategies compel the to choose between two enappealing model features: depending on the cost of default selected by the modeler, either the debt ratios are too high and the probability of default is toot low or the opposite is true. In view of the historical evidence that countries always default is too low or crisis, we propose a novel approach to the theory of debt default and develop a model that matches the key stylized facts regarding sovereign risk.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00692038.

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Date of creation: Apr 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00692038
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  1. David Benjamin & Mark L. J. Wright, 2009. "Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory Of Delays In Sovereign Debt Renegotiations," CAMA Working Papers 2009-15, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  2. Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath, 2004. "Defaultable debt, interest rates, and the current account," Working Papers 04-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  3. Goodwin, Thomas H, 1993. "Business-Cycle Analysis with a Markov-Switching Model," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 11(3), pages 331-39, July.
  4. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 117-125, September.
  5. Cristina Arellano, 2008. "Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
  6. Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2015. "Endogenous debt crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 337-369.
  7. Vivian Z. Yue, 2005. "Sovereign Default and Debt Renegotiation," 2005 Meeting Papers 138, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Cuadra, Gabriel & Sapriza, Horacio, 2008. "Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 78-88, September.
  9. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2010. "Quantitative properties of sovereign default models: solution methods matter," Working Paper 10-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  10. Fink, Fabian & Scholl, Almuth, 2016. "A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 176-190.
  11. Yeyati, Eduardo Levy & Panizza, Ugo, 2011. "The elusive costs of sovereign defaults," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 95-105, January.
  12. Sumru Altug & Melike Bildirici, 2010. "Business Cycles around the Globe: A Regime Switching Approach," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1009, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  13. Cruces, Juan J. & Trebesch, Christoph, 2013. "Sovereign defaults: The price of haircuts," Munich Reprints in Economics 20036, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  14. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2010. "Maturity, indebtedness, and default risk," Working Papers 10-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  15. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2010. "Quantitative properties of sovereign default models: solution methods," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 919-933, October.
  16. Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2007. "Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195534, March.
  17. repec:hrv:faseco:12491028 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Daniel Cohen & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. "Growth and External Debt Under Risk of Debt Repudiation," NBER Working Papers 1703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Jeremy A.Rogoff Bulow & Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 43, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  20. Reinhart, Carmen, 2009. "The Second Great Contraction," MPRA Paper 21485, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Carlos O. Arteta & Galina Hale, 2006. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," International Finance Discussion Papers 878, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  22. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1676-1706, August.
  23. World Bank, 2004. "World Development Indicators 2004," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13890, January.
  24. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Timothy J., 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 309-330, November.
  25. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  26. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
  27. David Benjamin, 2008. "Recovery Before Redemption," 2008 Meeting Papers 531, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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