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Perceptions and Misperceptions of Fiscal Inflation

In: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis

  • Eric M. Leeper
  • Todd B. Walker

The Great Recession and worldwide financial crisis have exploded fiscal imbalances and brought fiscal policy and inflation to the forefront of policy concerns. Those concerns will only grow as aging populations increase demands on government expenditures in coming decades. It is widely perceived that fiscal policy is inflationary if and only if it leads the central bank to print new currency to monetize deficits. Monetization can be inflationary. But it is a misperception that this is the only channel for fiscal inflations. Nominal bonds, the predominant form of government debt in advanced economies, derive their value from expected future nominal primary surpluses and money creation; changes in the price level can align the market value of debt to its expected real backing. This introduces a fresh channel, not requiring explicit monetization, through which fiscal deficits directly affect inflation. The paper describes various ways in which fiscal policy can directly affect inflation and explains why these fiscal effects are difficult to detect in time series data.

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This chapter was published in:
  • Alberto Alesina & Francesco Giavazzi, 2013. "Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ales11-1, August.
  • This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 12644.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12644
    Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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    2. Michael D. Bordo & Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, 2003. "Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One ?," DELTA Working Papers 2003-15, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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    24. George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2010. "Interest rate risk and other determinants of post WWII U.S. government debt/GDP dynamics," Working Papers 01, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School.
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