Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One ?
We show that the size of the French public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible to stabilize immediately after World War I, even on the anti-keynesian assumption that a stabilization would have had no negative effects on income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation was then not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context; nevertheless, a stabilization was historically possible from early 1924, and it would likely have benefited not only France but the entire international monetary system.
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