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Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis: Evidence for the Secondary Market Theory

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  • Filippo Brutti
  • Philip Ulrich Sauré

Abstract

The Euro Crisis has stopped the process of the European financial integration and triggered a strong repatriation of debt from foreign to domestic investors. We investigate this empirical pattern in light of competing theories of cross-border portfolio allocation. Three empirical regularities stand out: i) repatriation of debt occurred mainly in crisis countries; ii) repatriation affected mainly public debt; iii) public debt of crisis countries was reallocated to politically influential countries within the Euro Area. Standard theories are in line with pattern (i) at best. We argue that the full picture constitutes evidence for the "secondary market theory" of sovereign debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Filippo Brutti & Philip Ulrich Sauré, 2014. "Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis: Evidence for the Secondary Market Theory," Working Papers 2014-03, Swiss National Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2014-03
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Raphael A. Auer & Cedric Tille, 2016. "The banking sector and the Swiss financial account during the financial and European debt crises:," Aussenwirtschaft, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economics Research, vol. 67(02), pages 69-97, August.
    2. Yusuf Soner Baskaya & Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, 2016. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Lending: Evidence from 1999 Turkish Earthquake," NBER Working Papers 22335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bouvatier, Vincent & Delatte, Anne-Laure, 2015. "Waves of international banking integration: A tale of regional differences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 354-373.
    4. Engler, Philipp & Große Steffen, Christoph, 2016. "Sovereign risk, interbank freezes, and aggregate fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-61.
    5. Ohls, Jana, 2017. "Moral suasion in regional government bond markets," Discussion Papers 33/2017, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. Ersal-Kiziler, Eylem & Nguyen, Ha, 2016. "Euro currency risk and the geography of debt flows to peripheral EMU," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-20.
    7. Pauline Gandré, 2015. "Domestic creditors as last lenders in debt crises: a simple model with multiple equilibria," Post-Print halshs-01264630, HAL.
    8. Eylem Ersal Kiziler & Ha Nguyen, 2014. "Currency Risk and Business Cycle Risk in the Geography of Debt Flows to Peripheral Europe," Working Papers 14-03, UW-Whitewater, Department of Economics.
    9. Matteo Crosignani & Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Luís Fonseca, 2015. "The Portuguese Banking System during the Sovereign Debt Crisis," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    10. Gennaioli, Nicola & Martin, Alberto & Rossi, Stefano, 2014. "Banks, Government Bonds, and Default: What do the Data Say?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10044, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Patricia Gómez-González, 2015. "Financial innovation in sovereign borrowing and public provision of liquidity," Working Papers 1511, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    12. Große Steffen, Christoph, 2015. "Uncertainty shocks and non-fundamental debt crises: An ambiguity approach," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112936, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Pauline Gandré, 2015. "Domestic creditors as last lenders in debt crises: a simple model with multiple equilibria," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2915-2928.
    14. S.M. Ali Abbas & Raphael Espinoza, 2016. "Why Do Banks in Developing Countries Hold Government Securities?," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 2016-1, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt Repatriation; Sovereign Risk; Secondary Markets; Euro Crisis; Portfolio Home-Bias;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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