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Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment

Listed author(s):
  • Carlos Eduardo Gonçalves

    ()

  • Bernardo Guimarães

    ()

This paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default. A time-inconsistency problem arises: since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates, debtor countries choose suboptimally low fiscal adjustments. An international lender of last resort, capable of designing an implicit contract that coax debtors into a tougher fiscal stance via the provision of cheap (but senior) lending in times of crisis, can work as a commitment device and improve social welfare.

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File URL: http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/CarlosESGBernardoG23WP.pdf
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Paper provided by University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) in its series Working Papers, Department of Economics with number 2012_23.

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Date of creation: 18 Sep 2012
Handle: RePEc:spa:wpaper:2012wpecon23
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