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Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis

In: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System


  • Jeffrey D. Sachs


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1989. "Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis," NBER Chapters,in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 255-296 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:8992

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eaton, Jonathan & Taylor, Lance, 1986. "Developing country finance and debt," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 209-265, June.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:04:p:1467-1487_26 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Nelson, Joan M., 1984. "The political economy of stabilization: Commitment, capacity, and public response," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 12(10), pages 983-1006, October.
    4. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1985. "External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America and East Asia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 16(2), pages 523-573.
    5. Rogowski, Ronald, 1987. "Trade and the variety of democratic institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(02), pages 203-223, March.
    6. Fields, Gary S, 1984. "Employment, Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Seven Small Open Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 74-83, March.
    7. Bienen, Henry S. & Gersovitz, Mark, 1985. "Economic stabilization, conditionality, and political stability," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(04), pages 729-754, September.
    8. Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
    9. Weede, Erich, 1983. "The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross-National Analysis," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 21-39.
    10. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    11. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Import Competition and Response," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bhag82-1, January.
    12. Dick, G William, 1974. "Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 817-827, July/Aug..
    13. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Introduction to "Import Competition and Response"," NBER Chapters,in: Import Competition and Response, pages 1-8 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-666.
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Giulio Federico, 2001. "IMF Conditionality," Economics Papers 2001-W19, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
    2. Seghezza, Elena & Morelli, Pierluigi, 2014. "Conflict inflation and delayed stabilization," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 171-184.
    3. Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-82.
    4. Tito Cordella & Giovanni Dell'Aricca, 2002. "Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(Special i), pages 68-86.
    5. Sebastian Edwards, 1993. "The Political Economy of Infaliton and Stabilization in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 4319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mattia Osvaldo Picarelli, 2016. "Debt Overhang and Sovereign Debt Restructuring," Working Papers 9/16, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
    7. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Sachs, Jeffrey, 1989. "Efficient debt reduction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 194, The World Bank.
    9. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1996. "Sovereign debt, structural adjustment, and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 313-335, August.
    10. Gode, Constantino J., 2001. "Sovereign Debt and Uncertainty in the Mozambican Economy," WIDER Working Paper Series 130, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    11. Bhattacharya, Rina, 1997. "Pace, sequencing and credibility of structural reforms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 1045-1061, July.
    12. Woller, Gary M. & Hart, David Kirkwood, 1995. "Latin American debt, the IMF, and Adam Smith: A proposal for ethical reform," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-20.
    13. K. Ravi Raman, 2004. "The Asian Development Bank loan for Kerala (India): The adverse implications and search for alternatives," Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum Working Papers 357, Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum, India.
    14. Anne O. Krueger, 1998. "Whither the World Bank and the IMF?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1983-2020, December.
    15. Adrian Penalver, 2004. "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England.
    16. Omotunde E.G. JOHNSON, 2005. "Country Ownership Of Reform Programmes And The Implications For Conditionality," G-24 Discussion Papers 35, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    17. Prasanna Gai & Nicholas Vause, 2003. "Sovereign debt workouts with the IMF as delegated monitor - a common agency approach," Bank of England working papers 187, Bank of England.
    18. Eichengreen, Barry, 2015. "How the euro crisis ends: Not with a bang but a whimper," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 415-422.

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