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On the Role and Effects of IMF Seniority

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  • Diego Saravia

    (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

Abstract

We analyze the IMF as a lender to countries in financial distress highlighting the fact that it is a senior creditor. An advantage of delegating senior lending in a single institution rather than on competitive markets is that it would be able to reach the socially optimal solution. This would require the IMF not to intervene when the crisis is severe enough. However, a commitment device might be needed to achieve the socially optimal solution. If IMF lending were done for all shocks, the country would be always ex-post better off but lenders would be worse off when the country situation is either good or weak, which is consistent with empirical evidence. Anticipation of senior lending might make the country better off by preventing inefficient liquidation. However it might actually hurt the country ex-ante and too much rescuing in the future could lead to too little lending in the present which is contrary to the moral hazard critique.

Suggested Citation

  • Diego Saravia, 2007. "On the Role and Effects of IMF Seniority," Documentos de Trabajo 317, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:317
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2015. "Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-82.
    2. Corsetti, G. & Erce, A. & Uy, T., 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1730, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Boz, Emine, 2011. "Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 70-82, January.
    4. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2012. "On Creditor Seniority and Sovereign Bond Prices in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 3944, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Diego Saravia, 2010. "Vulnerability, Crisis and Debt Maturity: do IMF Interventions Shorten the Length of Borrowing?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 600, Central Bank of Chile.
    6. Fløgstad, Cathrin N. & Nordtveit, Ingvild, 2014. "Lending to developing countries: How do official creditors respond to sovereign defaults?," Working Papers in Economics 01/14, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    7. Chamley, Christophe & Pinto, Brian, 2012. "Sovereign bailouts and senior loans," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6181, The World Bank.
    8. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2012. "Debt dilution and seniority in a model of defaultable sovereign debt," Working Papers 12-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    9. Jorra, Markus, 2012. "The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 709-725.
    10. Diego Saravia, 2013. "Vulnerability, Crises and Debt Maturity: Do IMF Interventions Increase Reliance on Short-Term Debt?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 311-331, December.
    11. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & César Sosa-Padilla, 2016. "Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1383-1422.
    12. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2017. "Multilateral Loans and Interest Rates: Further Evidence on the Seniority Conundrum," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(2), pages 169-178, April.
    13. Cui, Wei, 2017. "Macroeconomic effects of delayed capital liquidation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86156, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2014. "The role of creditor seniority in Europe's sovereign debt crisis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 29(79), pages 495-552, July.
    15. Christophe Chamley & Brian Pinto, 2012. "Sovereign Bailouts and Senior Loans," NBER Chapters,in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012, pages 269-291 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Seniority; sovereign debt; IMF; ex-ante; ex-post; welfare effects;

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
    • E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General

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