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Sovereign Bailouts and Senior Loans

In: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012

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  • Christophe Chamley
  • Brian Pinto

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  • Christophe Chamley & Brian Pinto, 2012. "Sovereign Bailouts and Senior Loans," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012, pages 269-291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12780
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12780.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saravia, Diego, 2010. "On the role and effects of IMF seniority," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1024-1044, October.
    2. Mark Abrahamson & Tim Jenkinson & Howard Jones, 2011. "Why Don't U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(6), pages 2055-2082, December.
    3. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Bolton, Patrick & Jeanne, Olivier, 2005. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority," CEPR Discussion Papers 4901, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    5. Homi Kharas & Brian Pinto & Sergei Ulatov, 2001. "An Analysis of Russia's 1998 Meltdown: Fundamentals and Market Signals," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 32(1), pages 1-68.
    6. Christophe Chamley & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1981. "Asset Markets, General Equilibrium and the Neutrality of Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 605, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Chamley Christophe P & Pinto Brian, 2011. "Why Official Bailouts Tend Not To Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-5, February.
    8. Jakob von Weizsäcker, 2011. "Eurobonds- The blue bond concept and its implications," Bruegel Policy Contributions 509, Bruegel.
    9. Gale, Douglas, 1995. "Dynamic Coordination Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 1-18, January.
    10. Christophe Chamley & Herakles Polemarchakis, 1984. "Assets, General Equilibrium and the Neutrality of Money," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 129-138.
    11. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    12. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    13. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2012. "On Creditor Seniority and Sovereign Bond Prices in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 3944, CESifo.

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