Why Official Bailouts Tend Not To Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010
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- repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1085-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017.
"Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
- Timothy Kehoe & Juan Carlos Conesa, 2012. "Gambling for Redemption and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," 2012 Meeting Papers 614, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2015. "Gambling for Redemption and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," NBER Working Papers 21026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2012. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Staff Report 465, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2017.
"Multilateral Loans and Interest Rates: Further Evidence on the Seniority Conundrum,"
International Journal of Finance & Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(2), pages 169-178, April.
- Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2016. "Multilateral Loans and Interest Rates: Further Evidence on the Seniority Conundrum," CESifo Working Paper Series 6225, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2016. "Multilateral loans and interest rates: further evidence on the seniority conundrum," Working Papers 105, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrueck University, revised 30 Nov 2016.
- Gonzalo Fernandez-de-Cordoba & Pau Pujolas & Jose Torres, 2017. "Fiscal Discipline and Defaults," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 24, pages 1-13, March.
- Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2014.
"The role of creditor seniority in Europe's sovereign debt crisis,"
CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 29(79), pages 495-552, July.
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