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Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Conesa
  • Timothy J. Kehoe

Abstract

In January 1995, US President Bill Clinton organized a bailout for Mexico that imposed penalty interest rates and induced the Mexican government to reduce its debt, ending the debt crisis. Can the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) organize similar bailouts for the troubled countries in the eurozone? Our analysis suggests that debt levels are so high that bailouts with penalty interest rates could induce the eurozone governments to default rather than reduce their debt. A resumption of economic growth is one of the few ways that the eurozone crises can end.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2014. "Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 88-93, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:88-93
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.88
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    2. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence

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