Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?
In January 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton organized a bailout for Mexico that imposed penalty interest rates and induced the Mexican government to reduce its debt, ending the debt crisis. Can the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) organize similar bailouts for the troubled countries in the Eurozone? Our analysis suggests that debt levels are so high that bailouts with penalty interest rates could induce the Eurozone governments to default rather than reduce their debt. A resumption of economic growth is one of the few ways that the Eurozone crises can end.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2014. "Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 88-93, May.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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"Gambling for Redemption and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises,"
2012 Meeting Papers
614, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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