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Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Conesa
  • Timothy J. Kehoe

Abstract

In January 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton organized a bailout for Mexico that imposed penalty interest rates and induced the Mexican government to reduce its debt, ending the debt crisis. Can the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) organize similar bailouts for the troubled countries in the Eurozone? Our analysis suggests that debt levels are so high that bailouts with penalty interest rates could induce the Eurozone governments to default rather than reduce their debt. A resumption of economic growth is one of the few ways that the Eurozone crises can end.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2014. "Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?," NBER Working Papers 19909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19909
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    2. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-015-0939-y is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Aloisio Araujo & Marcia Leon & Rafael Santos, 2017. "Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 635-656, December.
    3. Pásztor, Szabolcs, 2017. "Mozaikok Európa újraegyesüléséhez - az amerikai külpolitika és az európai multinacionális vállalatok szerepe. Berend T. Iván: The History of European Integration - A new perspective. Routledge, New Yo," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 208-212.
    4. Gonzalo Fernandez-de-Cordoba & Pau Pujolas & Jose Torres, 2017. "Fiscal Discipline and Defaults," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 24, pages 1-13, March.
    5. Piotr Cizkowicz & Andrzej Rzonca & Andrzej Toroj, 2015. "In search for appropriate lower bound.Zero lower bound vs. positive lower bound under discretion and commitment," NBP Working Papers 215, Narodowy Bank Polski, Economic Research Department.
    6. Cassola, Nuno & Jorge, José, 2016. "The ECB's OMTs: A tale of governments, investors, and the central bank," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 94-116.
    7. Gabriel Desgranges & Celine Rochon, 2014. "Optimal Maturity Structure of Sovereign Debt in Situation of Near Default," IMF Working Papers 14/168, International Monetary Fund.
    8. repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1085-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    10. Vitor Gaspar, 2014. "The Making of a Continental Financial System; Lessons for Europe from Early American History," IMF Working Papers 14/183, International Monetary Fund.
    11. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2016. "Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation: A Macroeconomic View," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2458-2493, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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