IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecm/nasm04/290.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Country Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Tito Cordella
  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Abstract

The recent wave of financial crises has fueled the debate on the effect of IFIs intervention on governments' incentives to undertake reforms. In this paper we treat this intervention more generally as a country insurance contract, and examine its implications in a stylized set-up. More precisely, we identify the conditions under which the positive insurance effect dominates moral hazard considerations, and the channels through which this is achieved. In particular, we find that the case for country insurance is stronger for crisis-prone volatile economies, especially so if assistance is made contingent on the occurrence of adverse external macroeconomic shocks. Overall, our findings argue in favor of fairly-priced country insurance or insurance-type standing credit facilities that can be factored in ex ante by the borrowing government, as opposed to the customized discretionary bailouts

Suggested Citation

  • Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 290, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:290
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.19707.1075410691.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.),Capital Flows and the International Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    2. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    3. Ricardo J Caballero & Kevin Cowan & Jonathan Kearns, 2004. "Fear of Sudden Stops: Lessons from Australia and Chile," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2004-03, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    4. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
    5. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
    6. Sachs, Jeffrey & Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1996. "The Mexican peso crisis: Sudden death or death foretold?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 265-283, November.
    7. Augusto de la Torre & Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2003. "Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 43-108, January.
    8. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2006. "Catalytic finance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 161-177, September.
    9. Mr. Steven T Phillips & Mr. Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 2000/168, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1998. "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Working Papers 6606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    12. Rudger Dornbusch & Ilan Goldfajn & Rodrigo O. Valdés, 1995. "Currency Crises and Collapses," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(2), pages 219-294.
    13. Charles W. Calomiris, 1998. "The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-294, Winter.
    14. Alejandro Izquierdo & Ernesto Talvi & Guillermo A. Calvo, 2002. "Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons," Research Department Publications 4299, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    15. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 2001. "A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(2), pages 489-517.
    16. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, 1998. "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Ms. Isabel Schnabel, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 2002/181, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 408-432.
    19. Alejandro Izquierdo, 2002. "Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability in Argentina," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(7), pages 903-923, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Kapp & Marco Vega, 2014. "Real output costs of financial crises: A loss distribution approach," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 37(103), pages 13-28, Abril.
    2. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2008. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 219-266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kletzer, Kenneth, 2004. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt71b785gd, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    4. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    5. Guido Sandleris & Horacio Sapriza & Filippo Taddei, 2008. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 104, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2011.
    6. J. Brandes & Tobias Schüle, 2008. "IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 63-86, June.
    7. Ronald U. Mendoza, 2007. "A Compendium of Policy Instruments to Enhance Financial Stability and Debt Management in Emerging Market Economies," Working Papers 48, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    8. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2008. "Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 185-218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Kletzer, Kenneth, 2004. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt71b785gd, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    10. Eduardo Fernandez-Arias, 2010. "Multilateral Safety Nets for Financial Crises," Research Department Publications 4668, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    11. Kapp, Daniel & Vega, Marco, 2012. "The Real Output Costs of Financial Crisis: A Loss Distribution Approach," Working Papers 2012-013, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    12. Mr. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Mr. Alain Ize & Miguel A. Kiguel, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economies," IMF Working Papers 2005/188, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Does financial integration make banks act more prudential? Regulation, foreign owned banks, and the lender-of-last resort," Discussion Papers 2006/2, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    14. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    15. Daniel Kapp, 2012. "The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis," DNB Working Papers 349, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    16. Guido Sandleris & Filippo Taddei, 2007. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 66, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    17. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2006. "Catalytic finance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 161-177, September.
    18. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    19. Kletzer, Kenneth, 2005. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7337d1nw, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    20. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February.
    21. Jan Willem Gunning, 2005. "Pourquoi donner de l'aide ?," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 13(2), pages 7-50.
    22. Alain Ize & Miguel Kiguel & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economy," Business School Working Papers managsystrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    23. Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker, 2008. "Does financial integration make banks more vulnerable? Regulation, foreign owned banks, and the lender-of-last resort," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 371-393, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frankel, Jeffrey, 2010. "Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1439-1520, Elsevier.
    2. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    3. Bastidon, Cécile & Gilles, Philippe & Huchet, Nicolas, 2008. "The international lender of last resort and selective bail-out," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 144-152, June.
    4. Adrian Penalver, 2004. "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England.
    5. Jeffrey Frankel, 2005. "Contractionary Currency Crashes In Developing Countries," CID Working Papers 117, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    6. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    8. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    9. Komulainen, Tuomas, 2001. "Currency crises in emerging markets : Capital flows and herding behaviour," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2001, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    10. Olivier Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz, 2003. "The International Lender of Last Resort. How Large Is Large Enough?," NBER Chapters, in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 89-124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Saravia, Diego, 2010. "On the role and effects of IMF seniority," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1024-1044, October.
    12. Naqvi, Hassan, 2015. "Banking crises and the lender of last resort: How crucial is the role of information?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 20-29.
    13. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2010. "Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 16125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Cavallo, Eduardo A. & Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2008. "Does openness to trade make countries more vulnerable to sudden stops, or less? Using gravity to establish causality," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1430-1452, December.
    15. Luca Papi & Andrea F Presbitero & Alberto Zazzaro, 2015. "IMF Lending and Banking Crises," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(3), pages 644-691, November.
    16. Lee, Jong-Wha & Shin, Kwanho, 2008. "IMF bailouts and moral hazard," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 816-830, September.
    17. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1998. "The Asian liquidity crisis," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 98-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    18. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-5.
    19. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    20. Sergio Masciantonio, 2005. "The Role of Preference Structure and Moral Hazard in a Multiple Equilibria. Model of Financial Crises," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(6), pages 135-165, November-.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Crises; Bailouts; Moral Hazard; Insurance Effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:290. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.