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Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard

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  • Noy, Ilan

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  • Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:18:y:2008:i:1:p:64-78
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    Cited by:

    1. P. Hammer & A. Kogan & M. Lejeune, 2011. "Reverse-engineering country risk ratings: a combinatorial non-recursive model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 185-213, August.
    2. Kutan, Ali M. & Muradoğlu, Yaz G., 2016. "Financial and real sector returns, IMF-related news, and the Asian crisis," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 28-37.
    3. Kai Gehring & Valentin F. Lang, 2018. "Stigma or Cushion? IMF Programs and Sovereign Creditworthiness," CESifo Working Paper Series 7339, CESifo.
    4. Zuccardi Huertas Igor Esteban, 2015. "Sovereign Spreads in the Eurozone: Is Market Discipline Working?," Working Papers 2015-20, Banco de México.

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