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Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard

  • Noy, Ilan
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money.

Volume (Year): 18 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 64-78

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Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:18:y:2008:i:1:p:64-78
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/intfin

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  1. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2004. "Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January.
  2. Paolo Mauro & Yishay Yafeh & Nathan Sussman, 2001. "Emerging Market Spreads: Then Versus Now," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe03, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  3. Michael M. Hutchison, 2001. "A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs," NBER Working Papers 8305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Steven B. Kamin, 2002. "Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 736, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Default, Currency Crises and Sovereign Credit Ratings," NBER Working Papers 8738, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Working Papers 0044, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  7. William A. Niskanen, 1999. "Reshaping the Global Financial Architecture: Is There a Role for the IMF?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 18(3), pages 331-334, Winter.
  8. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Isabel Schnabel, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 02/181, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
  10. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
  11. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 6.
  12. Conway, Patrick, 1994. "IMF lending programs: Participation and impact," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 365-391, December.
  13. Knight, Malcolm & Santaella, Julio A., 1997. "Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 405-436, December.
  14. Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, 2000. "Measuring Real Economic Effects of Bailouts: Historical Perspectives on How Countries in Financial Distress Have Fared With and Without Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 7701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Joseph P. Joyce & Ilan Noy, 2008. "The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 413-430, 08.
  16. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
  17. Robert Dekle & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2001. "Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises: Theory and Empirical Evidence from East Asia," NBER Working Papers 8322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Renee Fry & Vance Martin & Brenda González-Hermosillo & Mardi Dungey, 2002. "International Contagion Effects from the Russian Crisis and the LTCM Near-Collapse," IMF Working Papers 02/74, International Monetary Fund.
  19. Reisen, Helmut & Von Maltzan, Julia & Larraín, Guillermo, 1998. "Emerging market risk and sovereign credit ratings," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34380, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
  20. A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 13-39, March.
  21. Hong G. Min, 1998. "Determinants of emerging market bond spread : do economic fundamentals matter?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1899, The World Bank.
  22. Dobeli, Barbara & Vanini, Paolo, 2004. "An analysis of IMF-induced moral hazard," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(12), pages 2933-2956, December.
  23. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-89, July.
  24. Lee, Sang H & Varela, Oscar, 1997. " An Investigation of Event Study Methodologies with Clustered Events and Event Day Uncertainty," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 211-28, May.
  25. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 5.
  26. Axel Dreher, 2004. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence," International Finance 0402003, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 2004.
  27. repec:cto:journl:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:85-103 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Homi Kharas & Brian Pinto & Sergei Ulatov, 2001. "An Analysis of Russia's 1998 Meltdown: Fundamentals and Market Signals," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 32(1), pages 1-68.
  29. Steven Phillips & Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
  30. Hutchison, Michael M. & Noy, Ilan, 2003. "Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored programs in Latin America: output costs, program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 991-1014, December.
  31. Lerrick, Adam & Meltzer, Allan H., 2003. "Blueprint for an international lender of last resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 289-303, January.
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