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Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard

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  • Noy, Ilan
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042-4431(06)00044-8
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money.

Volume (Year): 18 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 64-78

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Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:18:y:2008:i:1:p:64-78
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/intfin

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  1. Yishay Yafeh & Paolo Mauro & Nathan Sussman, 2000. "Emerging Market Spreads; Then Versus Now," IMF Working Papers 00/190, International Monetary Fund.
  2. repec:cto:journl:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:85-103 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Joseph P. Joyce & Ilan Noy, 2008. "The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 413-430, 08.
  4. Michael Hutchison & Ilan Noy, 2003. "Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored programs in Latin America: output costs, program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  5. Olivier D Jeanne & Jeronimo Zettelmeyer, 2004. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Working Papers 04/192, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Renee Fry & Vance Martin & Brenda Gonzalez-Hermosillo & Mardi Dungey, 2002. "International Contagion Effects from the Russian Crisis and the LTCM Near-Collapse," IMF Working Papers 02/74, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Lee, Sang H & Varela, Oscar, 1997. "An Investigation of Event Study Methodologies with Clustered Events and Event Day Uncertainty," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 211-228, May.
  8. Joshua Aizenman & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," NBER Working Papers 7004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
  10. Michael Hutchison, 2003. "A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 321-360 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Reisen, Helmut & Von Maltzan, Julia & Larraín, Guillermo, 1998. "Emerging market risk and sovereign credit ratings," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34380, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
  12. Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, 2000. "Measuring Real Economic Effects of Bailouts: Historical Perspectives on How Countries in Financial Distress Have Fared With and Without Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 7701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Robert Dekle & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2001. "Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises: Theory and Empirical Evidence from East Asia," NBER Working Papers 8322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Conway, Patrick, 1994. "IMF lending programs: Participation and impact," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 365-391, December.
  15. Dobeli, Barbara & Vanini, Paolo, 2004. "An analysis of IMF-induced moral hazard," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(12), pages 2933-2956, December.
  16. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Tito Cordella, 2004. "Country Insurance," IMF Working Papers 04/148, International Monetary Fund.
  17. William A. Niskanen, 1999. "Reshaping the Global Financial Architecture: Is There a Role for the IMF?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 18(3), pages 331-334, Winter.
  18. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
  19. Homi Kharas & Brian Pinto & Sergei Ulatov, 2001. "An Analysis of Russia's 1998 Meltdown: Fundamentals and Market Signals," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 32(1), pages 1-68.
  20. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-1089, July.
  21. Steven T Phillips & Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
  22. Knight, Malcolm & Santaella, Julio A., 1997. "Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 405-436, December.
  23. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
  24. A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 13-39, March.
  25. Steven B. Kamin, 2002. "Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 736, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  26. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Jeronimo Zettelmeyer & Isabel Schnabel, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending; A Test," IMF Working Papers 02/181, International Monetary Fund.
  27. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2004. "Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January.
  28. Hong G. Min, 1998. "Determinants of emerging market bond spread : do economic fundamentals matter?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1899, The World Bank.
  29. Reinhart, Carmen, 2002. "Default, currency crises, and sovereign credit ratings," MPRA Paper 13917, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Axel Dreher, 2004. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence," International Finance 0402003, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 2004.
  31. Lerrick, Adam & Meltzer, Allan H., 2003. "Blueprint for an international lender of last resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 289-303, January.
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