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An analysis of IMF-induced moral hazard

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  • Dobeli, Barbara
  • Vanini, Paolo

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.

Volume (Year): 28 (2004)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
Pages: 2933-2956

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:28:y:2004:i:12:p:2933-2956
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf

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  1. Ronald I. McKinnon & Huw Pill, 1996. "Credible Liberalizations and International Capital Flows: The "Overborrowing Syndrome"," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia, NBER-EASE Volume 5, pages 7-50 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
  3. Michael P. Dooley, 1997. "A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Working Papers 6300, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Chang, Roberto & Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 1-34, May.
  5. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
  6. Roberto Chang & Andrés Velasco, 2000. "Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14, pages 11-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78.
  8. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  9. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
  10. Steven T Phillips & Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, 1999. "Short-Term Capital Flows," NBER Working Papers 7364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:

  1. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  2. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
  3. Kutan, Ali M. & Muradoglu, Gulnur & Sudjana, Brasukra G., 2012. "IMF programs, financial and real sector performance, and the Asian crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 164-182.

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