An analysis of IMF-induced moral hazard
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- Dooley, Michael P, 2000.
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- Edward Simpson Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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