IMF Bailouts and Moral Hazard
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More about this item
KeywordsIMF; moral hazard; sovereign bond spreads; international financial architecture;
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
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