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IMF Surveillance and Financial Markets - A Political Economy Analysis

  • Marcel Fratzscher
  • Julien Reynaud

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the release PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in ‘defensive surveillance’.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2010/wp-cesifo-2010-06/cesifo1_wp3089.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3089.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3089
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