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Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis

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  • Marchesi, Silvia

Abstract

The existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an IMF programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial and official creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model. If countries who have arrangements with the IMF are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt we could conclude that the adoption of an IMF programme could work as a sort of signal of a country’s “good willingness”, which is thus rewarded with the debt relief. The results confirm the existence of a significant effect of the adoption of an IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by creditors.
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  • Marchesi, Silvia, 2003. "Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 403-423, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:403-423
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions

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