Interest Groups and Demand for IMF Arrangements: Empirical Analysis of the Duration of Periods without Agreement between the IMF and Sub-Saharan African Countries

This article aims to establish a connection between the political economy of the reform process in Sub-Saharan African countries and the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It focuses on the impact of IMF conditionality on the internal factors of the government decision-making process to reform. The paper examines the relationship between a government’s decision to turn to the IMF for assistance and the opposition capacity of interest groups. This link is tested through the estimation of a duration model, where the periods without agreement between the IMF and countries constitute the dependent variable. Parametric and non-parametric analyses show that economic factors are not the only ones that are taken into account by a government to request an IMF arrangement. The anticipated reaction of interest groups opposed to reforms can be an incentive for the government to request the intervention of the IMF. As an external actor, the IMF can initiate and support reforms with high political costs that a weak government cannot implement alone.