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Time present and time past: a duration analysis of IMF program spells

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  • Joseph P. Joyce

Abstract

The programs of the International Monetary Fund were originally designed to provide short-term assistance to countries implementing policies to address balance of payments disequilibria. In recent decades, however, the Fund has instituted new facilities with longer time horizons, while many developing countries have adopted consecutive programs. As a result, the length of time spent by countries in IMF programs has grown, and in some cases has extended over a decade. This paper analyzes the IMF program spells for a group of emerging economies over the period of 1982 to 1997. Duration models are used to investigate the time dependence of the failure rate of the spells and the factors that affect the duration of program spells. The hazard ratio of program spells has a non-monotonic shape, first rising and then falling over time. Program duration is extended for those countries with lower per-capita income, exports concentrated in primary goods, landlocked geographic status, and stable legal processes.

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  • Joseph P. Joyce, 2001. "Time present and time past: a duration analysis of IMF program spells," Working Papers 01-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbwp:01-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2007. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 640-666, November.
    2. Michael Hutchison, 2003. "A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs," NBER Chapters,in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 321-360 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hutchison, Michael M. & Noy, Ilan, 2003. "Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored programs in Latin America: output costs, program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 991-1014, December.
    4. Michael M. Hutchison, 2004. "Selection Bias and the Output Costs of IMF Programs," EPRU Working Paper Series 04-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    5. Morrissey, Oliver, 2002. "Recipient Governments' Willingness and Ability to Meet Aid Conditionality: The Effectiveness of Aid Finance and Conditions," WIDER Working Paper Series 105, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Yasemin Bal Gunduz, 2009. "Estimating Demand for IMF Financing by Low-Income Countries in Response to Shocks," IMF Working Papers 09/263, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Silvia Marchesi & Emanuela Sirtori, 2011. "Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 287-306, September.
    8. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility," Development Working Papers 202, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    9. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2006. "Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating IMF Responsibility," WIDER Working Paper Series 011, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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    Keywords

    Monetary policy ; International Monetary Fund;

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