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Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating IMF Responsibility

  • Marchesi, Silvia
  • Sabani, Laura

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File URL: http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/rp2006/rp2006-11.pdf
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Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Paper Series with number RP2006/11.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2006-11
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  1. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics," Department of Economics University of Siena 447, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  2. Svensson, J., 1995. "When Is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality," Papers 600, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  3. Easterly, William, 2005. "What did structural adjustment adjust?: The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-22, February.
  4. Bird, Graham & Hussain, Mumtaz & Joyce, Joseph P., 2004. "Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 231-251, March.
  5. Tito Cordella & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2003. "Budget Support Versus Project Aid," IMF Working Papers 03/88, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Michael Mussa & Miguel Savastano, 2000. "The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14, pages 79-128 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Knight, Malcolm & Santaella, Julio A., 1997. "Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 405-436, December.
  8. Conway, Patrick, 1994. "IMF lending programs: Participation and impact," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 365-391, December.
  9. Silvia Marchesi & Alessandro Missale, 2004. "What does motivate lending and aid to the HIPCs?," Development Working Papers 189, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  10. Joseph P. Joyce, 2001. "Time present and time past: a duration analysis of IMF program spells," Working Papers 01-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  11. Collier, Paul & Guillaumont, Patrick & Guillaumont, Sylviane & Gunning, Jan Willem, 1997. "Redesigning conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(9), pages 1399-1407, September.
  12. Allan Drazen, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(Special i), pages 36-67.
  13. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions On Imf Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 177-213, 07.
  14. Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 1997. "Aid, policies, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1777, The World Bank.
  15. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 563, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Rodney Ramcharan, 2003. "Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 03/192, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816755 is not listed on IDEAS
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