Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts
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- Spiros Bougheas & Indraneel Dasgupta & Oliver Morrissey, 2011. "Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 247-265, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
exclusivity; long-term loans; repayment conditions; investment conditions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2010-01-10 (Banking)
- NEP-CFN-2010-01-10 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CTA-2010-01-10 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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