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Sovereign debt workouts with the IMF as delegated monitor - a common agency approach

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  • Prasanna Gai
  • Nicholas Vause

Abstract

IMF programmes are frequently criticised for lacking focus and being ineffective in helping maintain private credit lines following a debt crisis. A theoretical model is developed to explore the interlinkages between result-based conditionality and creditor collective action problems. The strategic interactions between official and private creditors are highlighted, and some of the trade-offs that underpin the design of IMF programmes are clarified. Conditions under which official creditors are able to limit the efficiency losses generated by creditor non-cooperation and debtor moral hazard are identified. The circumstances under which official lending is able to catalyse private sector finance are also analysed.

Suggested Citation

  • Prasanna Gai & Nicholas Vause, 2003. "Sovereign debt workouts with the IMF as delegated monitor - a common agency approach," Bank of England working papers 187, Bank of England.
    • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:187
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    File URL: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/workingpapers/2003/wp187.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gai, Prasanna & Hayes, Simon & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 245-262, March.
    2. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1989. "Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis," NBER Chapters,in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 255-296 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Chui, Michael & Gai, Prasanna & Haldane, Andrew G., 2002. "Sovereign liquidity crises: Analytics and implications for public policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 519-546, March.
    4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    5. Diwan, I. & Rodrik, D., 1992. "External Debt, Adjustment, and Burden Sharing: A Unified Framework," Princeton Studies in International Economics 73, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    6. Giulio Federico, 2001. "IMF Conditionality," Economics Papers 2001-W19, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
    7. Mohsin S. Khan & Sunil Sharma, 2001. "IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs," IMF Working Papers 01/142, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1989. "Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis," NBER Chapters,in: Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, pages 275-284 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Marchesi, Silvia & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1999. "IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages 111-125, March.
    10. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 1-90.
    11. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1996. "Sovereign debt, structural adjustment, and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 313-335, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2006. "The IMF in a world of private capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1335-1357, May.

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