How can IMF policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities?
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- Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001.
"International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality,"
CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 407-432, October.
- Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 563, CESifo Group Munich.
- Giulio Federico, 2001. "IMF Conditionality," Economics Papers 2001-W19, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
- Marchesi, Silvia & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1999. "IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C111-25, March.
- Olivier Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz, 2001.
"The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?,"
NBER Working Papers
8381, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivier Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz, 2003. "The International Lender of Last Resort. How Large Is Large Enough?," NBER Chapters, in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 89-124 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeanne, Olivier & Wyplosz, Charles, 2001. "The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Olivier Jeanne, 2001. "The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enought?," IMF Working Papers 01/76, International Monetary Fund.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004.
"Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm339, Yale School of Management.
- Allan Drazen, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(Special i), pages 36-67.
- Peter B. Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the IMF: A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 01/137, International Monetary Fund.
- Alex Mourmouras & Wolfgang Mayer, 2002. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 02/73, International Monetary Fund.
- Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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