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Sovereign liquidity crises: analytics and implications for public policy

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  • Michael Chui
  • Prasanna Gui
  • Andrew G Haldane

Abstract

This paper offers an analytical framework with which to assess some recent proposals for strengthening the international financial architecture. A model is developed of sovereign liquidity crises that reflect two sources of financial stress - weak fundamentals and self-fulfilling expectations. The nature of the underlying co-ordination game is investigated, as are the properties of the unique equilibrium. In so doing, the paper characterises the welfare costs of belief-driven crises, which are found to be potentially significant. Some recent policy proposals are also evaluated, including prudent debt and liquidity management, capital controls, greater information disclosure, and the efficacy of monetary policy tightening in the midst of crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Chui & Prasanna Gui & Andrew G Haldane, 2000. "Sovereign liquidity crises: analytics and implications for public policy," Bank of England working papers 121, Bank of England.
  • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:121
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    Cited by:

    1. Christina E. Metz, 2002. "Private and Public Information in Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 76(1), pages 65-85, May.
    2. Axel Dreher & Bernhard Herz & Volker Karb, 2006. "Is there a causal link between currency and debt crises?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(4), pages 305-325.
    3. Gai, Prasanna & Hayes, Simon & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 245-262, March.
    4. Dreisbach, Dina & Kindermann, Fabian, 2008. "A note on Chui, Gai and Haldane's "Sovereign liquidity crisis: Analytics and implications for public policy"," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 624-629, April.
    5. Andrew G Haldane & Gregor Irwin & Victoria Saporta, 2004. "Bail out or work out? theoretical considerations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(494), pages 130-148, March.
    6. Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2006. "The IMF in a world of private capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1335-1357, May.
    7. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
    8. Prasanna Gai & Nicholas Vause, 2003. "Sovereign debt workouts with the IMF as delegated monitor - a common agency approach," Bank of England working papers 187, Bank of England.
    9. Philipp König & Kartik Anand & Frank Heinemann, 2013. "The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity Risk," Staff Working Papers 13-31, Bank of Canada.
    10. Alistair K. L. Milne, 2011. "Limited Liability Government Debt for the Eurozone -super-†," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(1), pages 44-78, March.
    11. Maltritz, Dominik, 2008. "Modelling the dependency between currency and debt crises: An option based approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 344-347, September.
    12. Marshall, David A., 2002. "Financial crises and coordination failure: A comment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 547-555, March.
    13. Murphy, Austin, 2003. "An empirical analysis of the structure of credit risk premiums in the Eurobond market," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 865-885, November.
    14. Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2135-2148, December.
    15. Michael P. Dooley & Sujata Verma, 2003. "Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises," NBER Chapters,in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 125-186 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt crises: could an international court minimize them?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 142, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    17. Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2009. "Coordination failure among multiple lenders and the role and effects of public policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 183-198, June.
    18. Aitor Erce-Domínguez, 2006. "Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises," Working Papers 0636, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    19. Christina E. Bannier & Frank Heinemann, 2005. "Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 374-374, September.
    20. Kenneth Kletzer, 2003. "Sovereign Bond Restructuring; Collective Action Clauses and official Crisis Intervention," IMF Working Papers 03/134, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Adrian Penalver, 2004. "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England.
    22. Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2013. "Investment complementarities, coordination failure, and the role and effects of public investment policy," Discussion Paper Series 589, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    23. Philipp König & Kartik Anand & Frank Heinemann, 2013. "The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-025, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

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