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International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability

  • Kenneth Rogoff

This paper asks how recent developments in research on banking and sovereign lending can help inform the debate on choosing a new international financial architecture. A broad range of plans is considered, including a global lender of last resort facility, an international bankruptcy court, an international debt insurance corporation, and unilateral controls on capital flows.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7265.

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Date of creation: Jul 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 21-42.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7265
Note: IFM
Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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  29. Morris Goldstein, 1998. "The Asian Financial Crisis," Policy Briefs PB98-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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