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Time Past and Time Present: a Duration Analysis of IMF Program Spells

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  • Joseph P. Joyce

Abstract

The programs of the IMF were designed to provide short‐term assistance to countries with balance‐of‐ payments disequilibria. Over time, however, the Fund instituted new facilities with longer time horizons, while many countries adopted consecutive programs. As a result, the length of time spent by countries in IMF programs has grown. This paper analyzes IMF program spells for a group of developing economies over the period of 1982–2000. Duration models are used to investigate the time dependence of the spells and the factors that affect their duration. The hazard ratio of spells has a nonmonotonic shape, first rising and then falling. Spell duration is independent of previous spell length or the number of spells. Program duration is extended for countries with lower income, exports concentrated in primary goods, landlocked geographic status and autocratic regimes. Governments that are polarized have shorter spells, which may reflect a breakdown in governance.

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  • Joseph P. Joyce, 2005. "Time Past and Time Present: a Duration Analysis of IMF Program Spells," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 283-297, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:13:y:2005:i:2:p:283-297
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00504.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vreeland,James Raymond, 2003. "The IMF and Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016957, Enero-Abr.
    2. Mr. Diego Saravia & Mr. Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Catalyzing Capital Flows: Do IMF-Supported Programs Work As Commitment Devices?," IMF Working Papers 2003/100, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The political economy of fiscal policy and inflation in developing countries : an empirical analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 703, The World Bank.
    4. International Monetary Fund, 1998. "Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? A Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 1998/169, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "The International Monetary Fund: 70 Years of Reinvention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    2. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2007. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 640-666, November.
    3. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, September.
    4. Yasemin Bal Gündüz, 2009. "Estimating Demand for IMF Financing by Low-Income Countries in Response to Shocks," IMF Working Papers 2009/263, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Christoph Moser & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011. "Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 307-340, September.
    6. Panchyshyn, Stepan & Hrabynska, Iryna, 2018. "About Spells And Recidivism Of The Transition Economies’ Participation In Imf Programs," EUREKA: Social and Humanities, Scientific Route OÜ, issue 5, pages 36-46.
    7. Presbitero, Andrea F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1969.
    8. Córcoles, David & Triguero, Ángela & Cuerva, María Carmen, 2016. "Comparing persistence of product and process innovation: A discrete-time duration analysis of innovation spells," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 10, pages 1-35.
    9. Bédhat Jean-Marc Atsebi & Jean-Louis Combes & Alexandru Minea, 2019. "The trade costs of financial crises," Working Papers halshs-01990335, HAL.
    10. Bal Gündüz, Yasemin, 2016. "The Economic Impact of Short-term IMF Engagement in Low-Income Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 30-49.
    11. Joseph P. Joyce & Ilan Noy, 2008. "The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 413-430, August.
    12. Silvia Marchesi & Emanuela Sirtori, 2011. "Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 287-306, September.
    13. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility," Development Working Papers 202, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    14. Takuya Takahashi & Masao Nakamura, 2010. "The impact of operational characteristics on firms' EMS decisions: strategic adoption of ISO 14001 certifications," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 215-229, July.
    15. Rune Hagen, 2012. "Certified or branded?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 203-230, June.
    16. Baier, Scott L & Bergstrand, Jeffery H & Mariutto, Roland., 2010. "The Growth of Bilateralism," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 12, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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