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Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs

  • Boz, Emine

The data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is small, intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors. The IFI loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them. Taking these contractual differences as given, this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of IFI loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the IFIs.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 83 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 70-82

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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:83:y:2011:i:1:p:70-82
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