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Optimal External Debt and Default

  • Bernardo Guimaraes

This paper analyses whether sovereign default episodes can be seen as contingencies of optimal international lending contracts. The model considers a small open economy with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. Taking first order approximations of Bellman equations, I derive analytical expressions for the equilibrium level of debt and the optimal debt contract. In this environment, debt relief generated by reasonable fluctuations in productivity is an order of magnitude below that generated by shocks to world interest rates. Debt relief prescribed by the model following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 accounts for a substantial part of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0847.

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Date of creation: Feb 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0847
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP

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  34. repec:rus:hseeco:123922 is not listed on IDEAS
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