IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis

Listed author(s):
  • Guido Sandleris
  • Filippo Taddei

A small number of countries have issued real indexed sovereign debt in recent year. This type of contracts could improve risk sharing between debtor countries and international creditors and diminish the probability of occurrence of debt crises. However, it is not clear the magnitude of these effects in terms of welfare. Furthermore, it has not been analyzed whether the design of the existing contracts was optimal. This paper addresses these issues. We characterize the optimal features of indexed debt contracts in a dynamic stochastic equilibrium framework with incomplete markets and compare them to existing ones. Finally, we obtain a quantitative approximation of the welfare effects of indexation. We find that the optimal contract improves welfare and features payments increasing in the state of the economy. Existing real indexed contracts usually entail payments increasing in the state of the economy. However, they also feature threshold levels of the chosen real variable that trigger payments. We argue that the latter are usually suboptimal. Calibrating our model to Argentina’s economy we find that the welfare gains from introducing indexed debt are equivalent to an increase of between 0.6% and 2%.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.66.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 66.

as
in new window

Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:66
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Via Real Collegio, 30, 10024 Moncalieri (To)

Phone: +390116705000
Fax: +390116476847
Web page: http://www.carloalberto.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Wright, Brian D., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt4qg3c42v, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath, 2004. "Defaultable debt, interest rates, and the current account," Working Papers 04-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  3. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1997. "Reviving reputation models of international debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 21-30.
  4. Martin Uribe & Vivian Z. Yue, 2003. "Country Spreads and Emerging Countries: Who Drives Whom?," NBER Working Papers 10018, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. William R. Zame, 1990. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are Incomplete," UCLA Economics Working Papers 585, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
  7. R. G Gelos & Guido M Sandleris & Ratna Sahay, 2004. "Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries; What Determines Market Access?," IMF Working Papers 04/221, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Arellano, Cristina, 2008. "Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies," MPRA Paper 7867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Joshua Aizenman & Jaewoo Lee, 2005. "International Reserves; Precautionary vs. Mercantilist Views, Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 05/198, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Joshua Aizenman & Jaewoo Lee, 2006. "Financial Versus Monetary Mercantilism-Long-run View of Large International Reserves Hoarding," NBER Working Papers 12718, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Sandleris, Guido, 2008. "Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 267-275, December.
  12. Dooley, Michael P., 2000. "International financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 361-377, December.
  13. Ricardo Caballero & Stavros Panageas, 2006. "Contingent Reserves Management: An Applied Framework," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Ricardo Caballero & César Calderón & Luis Felipe Céspedes & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Sc (ed.), External Vulnerability and Preventive Policies, edition 1, volume 10, chapter 12, pages 399-420 Central Bank of Chile.
  14. Pablo A. Neumeyer & Fabrizio Perri, 2004. "Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: The Role of Interest Rates," NBER Working Papers 10387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. " LDC Debt: Forgiveness, Indexation, and Investment Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(5), pages 1335-1350, December.
  16. James Daniel, 2001. "Hedging Government Oil Price Risk," IMF Working Papers 01/185, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Tito Cordella, 2004. "Country Insurance," IMF Working Papers 04/148, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2002. "Reviving the Case for GDP-Indexed Bonds," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 02/10, International Monetary Fund.
  19. Eduardo Borensztein & Olivier D Jeanne & Paolo Mauro & Jeronimo Zettelmeyer & Marcos d Chamon, 2005. "Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention," IMF Occasional Papers 237, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The case for GDP-indexed bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 165-216, 04.
  21. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
  22. Cuadra, Gabriel & Sapriza, Horacio, 2008. "Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 78-88, September.
  23. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
  24. Carlos O. Arteta & Galina Hale, 2006. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," International Finance Discussion Papers 878, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  25. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeronimo Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy Reorganization; A Survey," IMF Working Papers 02/57, International Monetary Fund.
  26. Tauchen, George & Hussey, Robert, 1991. "Quadrature-Based Methods for Obtaining Approximate Solutions to Nonlinear Asset Pricing Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 371-396, March.
  27. Robert E. Lucas Jr., 2003. "Macroeconomic Priorities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 1-14, March.
  28. Jaewoo Lee, 2004. "Insurance Value of International Reserves; An Option Pricing Approach," IMF Working Papers 04/175, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Giovanni Bert)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.