IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework

  • Guido Sandleris
  • Horacio Sapriza
  • Filippo Taddei

A number of countries have issued sovereign debt instruments indexed to real variables in recent years. This type of contracts could improve risk sharing between debtor countries and international creditors and diminish the probability of occurrence of debt crises. This paper characterizes the optimal features of real indexed sovereign debt contracts in a dynamic stochastic equilibrium framework with incomplete markets. We show that the optimal indexed debt contract should not be studied abstracting from the total portfolio of assets and liabilities of the issuing country. We also show that the optimal contract is similar to an insurance contract, and that a country can replicate it using existing instruments, in particular, a combination of international reserves and GDP-indexed bonds. Calibrating our model to Argentina's economy we find that the welfare gains from introducing indexed debt and allowing asset accumulation could be equivalent to an increase of between 0.1% and 0.5% in certainty equivalent aggregate consumption.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.utdt.edu/download.php?fname=_136215123389562600.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in its series Business School Working Papers with number 2009-01.

as
in new window

Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:2009-01
Contact details of provider: Postal: Miñones 2177 - (1428) Buenos Aires
Web page: http://www.utdt.edu/listado_contenidos.php?id_item_menu=4994
More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. James Daniel, 2001. "Hedging Government Oil Price Risk," IMF Working Papers 01/185, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Ricardo Caballero & Stavros Panageas, 2005. "Contingent Reserves Management: An Applied Framework," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 329, Central Bank of Chile.
  3. Sandleris, Guido, 2008. "Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 267-275, December.
  4. Carlos Arteta & Galina Hale, 2006. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," International Finance Discussion Papers 878, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Pablo Andres Neumeyer & Fabrizio Perri, 1999. "Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: the role of interest rates," Department of Economics Working Papers 014, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  6. Joshua Aizenman & Jaewoo Lee, 2005. "International Reserves; Precautionary vs. Mercantilist Views, Theory, and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 05/198, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Martin Uribe & Vivian Yue, 2004. "Country spreads and emerging countries: who drives whom?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
  8. William R. Zame, 1990. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are Incomplete," UCLA Economics Working Papers 585, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Buera, Francisco & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 2004. "Optimal maturity of government debt without state contingent bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 531-554, April.
  10. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. " LDC Debt: Forgiveness, Indexation, and Investment Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(5), pages 1335-50, December.
  11. Aizenman, Joshua & Lee, Jaewoo, 2007. "Financial versus Monetary Mercantilism-Long-run View of Large International Reserves Hoarding," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5r95t1xf, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  12. Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath, 2004. "Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Current Account," NBER Working Papers 10731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Gelos, R. Gaston & Sahay, Ratna & Sandleris, Guido, 2011. "Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 243-254, March.
  14. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
  15. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 6.
  16. Dooley, Michael P., 2000. "International financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 361-377, December.
  17. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2002. "Reviving the Case for GDP-Indexed Bonds," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 02/10, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Jaewoo Lee, 2004. "Insurance Value of International Reserves; An Option Pricing Approach," IMF Working Papers 04/175, International Monetary Fund.
  19. Guillermo A. Calvo & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2000. "Contagion, Globalization, and the Volatility of Capital Flows," NBER Chapters, in: Capital Flows and the Emerging Economies: Theory, Evidence, and Controversies, pages 15-41 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Early Ideason Sovereign Bankruptcy Reorganization: A Survey," IMF Working Papers 02/57, International Monetary Fund.
  21. Gabriel Cuadra & Horacio Sapriza, 2006. "Sovereign Default, Interest Rates and Political Uncertainty in Emerging Markets," Working Papers 2006-02, Banco de México.
  22. Jaewoo Lee & Joshua Aizenman, 2006. "Financial Versus Monetary Mercantilism; Long-Run View of the Large International Reserves Hoarding," IMF Working Papers 06/280, International Monetary Fund.
  23. Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
  24. Tauchen, George & Hussey, Robert, 1991. "Quadrature-Based Methods for Obtaining Approximate Solutions to Nonlinear Asset Pricing Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 371-96, March.
  25. Guillermo A. Calvo, 1998. "Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 35-54, November.
  26. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Eduardo Borensztein & Olivier Jeanne & Paolo Mauro & Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Marcos Chamon, 2005. "Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention," IMF Occasional Papers 237, International Monetary Fund.
  28. Robert E. Lucas Jr., 2003. "Macroeconomic Priorities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 1-14, March.
  29. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:2009-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nicolás Del Ponte)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.