IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecm/latm04/136.html

Country Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati
  • Tito Cordella

Abstract

To understand the consequences of the presence of international safety nets on governments' incentives to undertake reforms, we model IFIs´ interventions as country insurance policies. We find that country insurance (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) is more likely to foster reforms in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance on reform incentives, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms aimed at mitigating the cost of crises will be partially substituted for by insurance, and may be ultimately discouraged; by contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay off more generously in the absence of a crisis will instead be promoted

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Tito Cordella, 2004. "Country Insurance," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 136, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:136
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Kapp & Marco Vega, 2014. "Real output costs of financial crises: A loss distribution approach," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 37(103), pages 13-28, Abril.
    2. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2008. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 219-266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mr. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Mr. Alain Ize & Miguel A. Kiguel, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economies," IMF Working Papers 2005/188, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Guido Sandleris & Filippo Taddei, 2007. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 66, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    5. Kletzer, Kenneth, 2004. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt71b785gd, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    6. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February.
    7. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2006. "Catalytic finance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 161-177, September.
    8. Kapp, Daniel & Vega, Marco, 2012. "The Real Output Costs of Financial Crisis: A Loss Distribution Approach," Working Papers 2012-013, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    9. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    10. Fernández-Arias, Eduardo, 2010. "Multilateral Safety Nets for Financial Crises," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1508, Inter-American Development Bank.
    11. Jan Willem Gunning, 2005. "Pourquoi donner de l'aide ?," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 13(2), pages 7-50.
    12. Alain Ize & Miguel Kiguel & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economy," Business School Working Papers managsystrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    13. Guido Sandleris & Horacio Sapriza & Filippo Taddei, 2008. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 104, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2011.
    14. J. Brandes & Tobias Schüle, 2008. "IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 63-86, June.
    15. Ronald U. Mendoza, 2007. "A Compendium of Policy Instruments to Enhance Financial Stability and Debt Management in Emerging Market Economies," Working Papers 48, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    16. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    17. Daniel Kapp, 2012. "The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis," DNB Working Papers 349, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    18. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    19. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Does Financial Integration Make Banks Act More Prudential? Regulation, Foreign Owned Banks, and the Lender-of-Last Resort," HWWA Discussion Papers 339, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    20. Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker, 2008. "Does financial integration make banks more vulnerable? Regulation, foreign owned banks, and the lender-of-last resort," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 371-393, February.
    21. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2008. "Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 185-218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:136. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.