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Multilateral Safety Nets for Financial Crises

  • Eduardo Fernandez-Arias


There is an increasing need for a system of international lending of last resort (ILLR) to provide a safety net in the event of financial crises in vulnerable countries as financial globalization deepens and spreads. Multilateral progress to address liquidity and solvency crises has been patchy and inconsistent, with no clear distinction between the two; in particular, there is still no framework to address sovereign debt restructuring. This paper proposes an integrated system of specialized ILLR facilities to address problems of liquidity, adjustment, and debt restructuring in a focused but robust way as crises evolve and morph, structured in tiers to cater to countries’ capacity to prequalify for automatic support. It further proposes feasible legal reform to subject creditors to standstills and seniority dilution as in domestic bankruptcy in order to empower ILLR to facilitate orderly workouts in debt restructuring. Multilateral development banks would play important supporting roles.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4668.

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Date of creation: Jun 2010
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4668
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  1. Eduardo Fernández-Arias & Andrew Powell & Alessandro Rebucci, 2009. "The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6770, Inter-American Development Bank.
  2. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Tito Cordella, 2004. "Country Insurance," IMF Working Papers 04/148, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-98, September.
  4. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Bagehot, Walter, 1873. "Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number bagehot1873.
  6. Guillermo A. Calvo, 2002. "Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in Emerging Markets," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-31, January.
  7. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2006. "Optimal Debt? On the Insurance Value of International Debt Flows to Developing Countries," Business School Working Papers 2006-12, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
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