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The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis

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  • Daniel Kapp

Abstract

This study presents a core-periphery model to determine the optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), building on Jeanne and Ranciere (2011). While the periphery is subject to a probability of losing access to external credit, the core's incentive for setting up an ESM stems exclusively from the spillover effects present in the case of periphery default. The model develops regional best response functions, determining a set of feasible ranges for the total ESM size, given optimal regional contributions. The model is then calibrated to the European Economic and Monetary Union. If costs from default are reasonably high, the probability of the periphery not having access to external credit is sufficiently large, and spillover effects to the core are present, both the core and the periphery have an interest in contributing to the ESM. Calibration and sensitivity analysis suggest that the optimal ESM size is between the current and twice the size of the agreed-upon ESM.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Kapp, 2012. "The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis," DNB Working Papers 349, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:349
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    File URL: https://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Working%20Paper%20349_tcm47-277028.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandra M. D. Hild & Bernhard Herz & Christian Bauer, 2016. "The European Stability Mechanism - bastion of calm or crisis accelerant?," Research Papers in Economics 2016-12, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    2. Jon Frost, 2015. "A theory of bazookas; or, "when (and when not) to use large-scale official sector support"," DNB Working Papers 479, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    3. Jan Willem van den End & Marco Hoeberichts, 2012. "The interaction between the central bank and government in tail risk scenarios," DNB Working Papers 352, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    4. Herz, Bernhard & Bauer, Christian & Hild, Alexandra, 2016. "Designing the ESM—Who Profits, Who Pays?," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145709, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ESM; ESFR; Financial Crisis; Insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General

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