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Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in Emerging Markets

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  • Guillermo A. Calvo

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Abstract

Capital inflows to emerging market economies rose to unprecedented heights in the first part of the 1990s and then collapsed very rapidly in the second. Such volatility could partly be explained by financial vulnerability in the emerging markets themselves, but the global nature of the phenomenon raises the suspicion that the world financial market is wrought with systemic problems that are largely independent of the individual countries affected. This paper puts forward the conjecture that phenomena such as contagion could stem from the way the capital market operates (for example, crises generated by margin calls). These systemic phenomena require systemic instruments. Unfortunately, few are available. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) operates more like a fire department than like a central bank. Liquidity is sprayed where fire is found, not on the system as a whole in the manner of a central bank faced with a liquidity crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillermo A. Calvo, 2002. "Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in Emerging Markets," ECONOMIA JOURNAL, THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-31, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000425:008696
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2000. "Fixing for Your Life," NBER Working Papers 8006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Fear of Floating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 379-408.
    3. Hausmann, Ricardo & Panizza, Ugo & Stein, Ernesto, 2001. "Why do countries float the way they float?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 387-414, December.
    4. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-248, April.
    5. Guillermo A. Calvo & Leonardo Leiderman & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1993. "Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(1), pages 108-151, March.
    6. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    7. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1976. "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1161-1176, December.
    8. Reinhart, Carmen & Calvo, Guillermo, 2000. "When Capital Inflows Come to a Sudden Stop: Consequences and Policy Options," MPRA Paper 6982, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Calvo, Guillermo A & Rodriguez, Carlos Alfredo, 1977. "A Model of Exchange Rate Determination under Currency Substitution and Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 617-625, June.
    10. Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi (ed.), 1998. "The Political Economy of Reform," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262194007, March.
    11. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Timothy J., 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 309-330, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial crisis; contagion; capital movements; systemic phenomena;

    JEL classification:

    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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