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The Political Economy of Reform


  • Federico Sturzenegger

    (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University)

  • Mariano Tommasi

    (Universidad de San Andres)


In this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and East European countries. They apply common standards of analytical rigor to the study of economic and political behavior, assuming political agents to be rational and forward-looking, with expectations consistent with the properties of the underlying model. The book is organized around three basic questions: first, why do reforms take place? Second, how are reforms implemented? And third, which candidates are most likely to undertake reform? Although most of the chapters deal with policy issues in developing economies, the findings also apply to areas such as social security and health care reform in industrialized countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi (ed.), 1998. "The Political Economy of Reform," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262194007, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262194007

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Michael Kumhof & Evan C Tanner, 2005. "Government Debt; A Key Role in Financial Intermediation," IMF Working Papers 05/57, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen Reinhart, 2003. "The Center and the Periphery: The Globalization of Financial Turmoil," NBER Working Papers 9479, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Amartya Lahiri & Rajesh Singh & Carlos A. Vegh, 2007. "Optimal Exchange Rate Regimes: Turning Mundell-Fleming's Dictum on its Head," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 54(3), pages 249-270, September.
    4. Fabrizio Coricelli & Bostjan Jazbec & Igor Masten, 2008. "Sources and Obstacles for Growth in Transition Countries: The Role of Credit," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00643347, HAL.
    5. repec:hal:journl:hal-00643347 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Bela Greskovits, 1999. "Consolidating Economic Reforms: the Hungarian Experience with Lessons for Poland," CASE-CEU Working Papers 0031, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    2. Dolls, Mathias & Peichl, Andreas & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 2011. "A Challenge for the G20: Globally Stipulated Debt Brakes and Transnational Independent Fiscal Supervisory Councils," IZA Discussion Papers 6160, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," CRSP working papers 492, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    4. Alejandro Izquierdo & Ernesto Talvi & Guillermo A. Calvo, 2002. "Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons," Research Department Publications 4299, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    5. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Research Department Publications 4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    6. Chang, Roberto & Hevia, Constantino & Loayza, Norman, 2009. "Privatization and nationalization cycles," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5029, The World Bank.
    7. Kroszner, Randall S. & Laeven, Luc & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2007. "Banking crises, financial dependence, and growth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 187-228, April.
    8. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 151, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability," NBER Working Papers 7319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Brown, Jeffrey R. & Kroszner, Randall S. & Jenn, Brian H., 2002. "Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 55(3), pages 647-657, September.
    11. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The supply of and demand for financial regulation : public and private competition around the globe : commentary," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 137-149.
    12. Laeven, Luc & Klingebiel, Daniela & Kroszner, Randy, 2002. "Financial crises, financial dependence, and industry growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2855, The World Bank.
    13. Graham Bird, 2008. "The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 41-64, March.
    14. Mícheál O’Keeffe & Alessio Terzi, 2015. "The political economy of financial crisis policy," Working Papers 888, Bruegel.
    15. M. Morrison , Kevin & Singer, Matthew M., 2006. "The Challenges of “Deliberative Development”: Bolivia’s Experience with a National Dialogue," Documentos de trabajo 5/2006, Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Económicas (IISEC), Universidad Católica Boliviana.
    16. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    17. Guillermo A. Calvo, 2002. "Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in Emerging Markets," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-31, January.
    18. Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, 1997. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in the Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization, 1934-1945," NBER Working Papers 6112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Carsten Helm & Michael Neugart, 2013. "Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 383-406, September.
    20. Eduardo Levy & Federico Sturzenegger, 2000. "Is EMU a Blueprint for Mercosur?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 37(110), pages 63-99.

    More about this item


    reform; developing economies;

    JEL classification:

    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General


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