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Country Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Tito Cordella

    (International Monetary Fund)

  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine how country insurance schemes affect policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted. Copyright 2005, International Monetary Fund

Suggested Citation

  • Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:52:y:2005:i:si:p:6
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Kapp & Marco Vega, 2014. "Real output costs of financial crises: A loss distribution approach," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 37(103), pages 13-28, Abril.
    2. Kletzer, Kenneth, 2004. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt71b785gd, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    3. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    4. Guido Sandleris & Horacio Sapriza & Filippo Taddei, 2008. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 104, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2011.
    5. J. Brandes & Tobias Schüle, 2008. "IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 63-86, June.
    6. Ronald U. Mendoza, 2007. "A Compendium of Policy Instruments to Enhance Financial Stability and Debt Management in Emerging Market Economies," Working Papers 48, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    7. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2008. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 219-266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Mr. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Mr. Alain Ize & Miguel A. Kiguel, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economies," IMF Working Papers 2005/188, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    10. Daniel Kapp, 2012. "The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis," DNB Working Papers 349, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    11. Guido Sandleris & Filippo Taddei, 2007. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 66, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    12. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    13. Kletzer, Kenneth, 2004. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt71b785gd, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    14. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February.
    15. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2006. "Catalytic finance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 161-177, September.
    16. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Does Financial Integration Make Banks Act More Prudential? Regulation, Foreign Owned Banks, and the Lender-of-Last Resort," HWWA Discussion Papers 339, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    17. Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker, 2008. "Does financial integration make banks more vulnerable? Regulation, foreign owned banks, and the lender-of-last resort," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 371-393, February.
    18. Kapp, Daniel & Vega, Marco, 2012. "The Real Output Costs of Financial Crisis: A Loss Distribution Approach," Working Papers 2012-013, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    19. Fernández-Arias, Eduardo, 2010. "Multilateral Safety Nets for Financial Crises," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1508, Inter-American Development Bank.
    20. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2008. "Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 185-218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Jan Willem Gunning, 2005. "Pourquoi donner de l'aide ?," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 13(2), pages 7-50.
    22. Alain Ize & Miguel Kiguel & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economy," Business School Working Papers managsystrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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