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Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort: How crucial is the role of information?

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  • Hassan Naqvi

    (NUS Business School, & Financial Markets Group, LSE)

Abstract

This article develops a model of bank runs and crises and analyses how the presence of a lender of last resort (LOLR) affects the solvency of the banking system. We obtain a one to one mapping from the depositors' equilibrium strategy to an optimal contract prevailing in the economy. The study finds that the difference between a perfectly informed and an imperfectly informed LOLR can be crucial. Our results indicate that a perfectly informed LOLR is a Pareto improvement. However, if the supervisory process of the LOLR is subject to noise, then the gains from ex post efficiency may be outweighed by ex ante inefficiency induced by moral hazard which is conducive to lower lending rates in the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Hassan Naqvi, 2004. "Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort: How crucial is the role of information?," Finance 0410009, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0410009
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Goodhart, Charles A.E. & Huang, Haizhou, 2005. "The lender of last resort," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1059-1082, May.
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    5. Acharya, Viral & Naqvi, Hassan, 2012. "The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 349-366.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Acharya, Viral & Naqvi, Hassan, 2012. "The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 349-366.
    2. Clemens Jobst & Kilian Rieder, 2016. "Principles, circumstances and constraints: the Nationalbank as lender of last resort from 1816 to 1931," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 3, pages 140-162.
    3. Hałaj, Grzegorz, 2006. "Contagion effect in banking system - measures based on randomised loss scenarios," MPRA Paper 525, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Hassan Naqvi, 2014. "IMF Conditionality and the Intertemporal Allocation of Resources," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 203-235, June.
    5. Cecile Bastidon & Philippe Gilles & Nicolas Huchet, 2008. "A Selective Bail-Out International Lending of Last Resort Model," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(1), pages 103-114, May.
    6. Hryckiewicz, Aneta, 2014. "What do we know about the impact of government interventions in the banking sector? An assessment of various bailout programs on bank behavior," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 246-265.
    7. Bastidon, Cécile & Gilles, Philippe & Huchet, Nicolas, 2008. "The international lender of last resort and selective bail-out," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 144-152, June.
    8. Moheeput, Ashwin, 2008. "Financial Systems, Micro-Systemic Risks and Central Bank Policy : An Analytical Taxonomy of the Literature," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 856, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank runs; lender of last resort; transparency;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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