Banking Panics and Business Cycles
Using a century of newly constructed data, competing theories explaining banking panics are tested. The evidence shows that banking panics during the U.S. national banking era (1865-1914) were the products of revisions in the perceived risk of the banking system based on the arrival of new information. Panics were triggered by a leading indicator of recession. Whenever this variable reached a threshold level, there was a panic. Thus, panics were not random events. The panics of the 1930s, however, did not result from the same pre-Federal Reserve System pattern of behavior. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 40 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:40:y:1988:i:4:p:751-81. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.