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Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard

In: Capital Flows and the International Financial System

Author

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  • Michael Mussa

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume,in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.), Capital Flows and the International Financial System Reserve Bank of Australia.
  • Handle: RePEc:rba:rbaacv:acv1999-13
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    File URL: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/1999/pdf/mussa.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    2. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    3. Reynaud, Julien & Vauday, Julien, 2009. "Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 139-162, May.
    4. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    5. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-5.
    6. Priyadarshani Joshi & Jeronimo Zettelmeyer, 2005. "Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973–2003," IMF Working Papers 05/8, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Reynaud, Julien & Vauday, Julien, 2008. "IMF lending and geopolitics," Working Paper Series 965, European Central Bank.
    8. Brooke, Martin & Pienkowski, Alex & Mendes, Rhys & Santor, Eric, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 27: Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 27, Bank of England.
    9. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 407-432, October.
    10. Jeronimo Zettelmeyer & Jonathan David Ostry & Olivier D Jeanne, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Peter B. Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the IMF; A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 01/137, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Jun I Kim, 2007. "Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 07/104, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.

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