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Commercial banks, default insurance and IMF reforms

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  • Rockerbie, Duane W.
  • Easton, Stephen T.

Abstract

This paper discusses, in a very general way, a system of IMF insurance against sovereign default that could be offered to private lenders and banking groups. The system could overcome many of the current issues that plague the international private lending market, such as moral hazard on the part of private lenders, capital flight, and so on. How the insurance could be priced is also discussed in an appendix. Private lender membership in the IMF is also discussed. This would provide the IMF with some of the powers that central banks now have.

Suggested Citation

  • Rockerbie, Duane W. & Easton, Stephen T., 2009. "Commercial banks, default insurance and IMF reforms," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-39, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:200939
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt; insurance; option value; IMF;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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