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Crisis resolution: next steps

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  • Barry Eichengreen
  • Kenneth Kletzer
  • Ashoka Mody

Abstract

At the April 2003 meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committees, it was decided to further encourage the contractual approach to smoothing the process of sovereign debt restructuring by encouraging the more widespread use of collective action clauses (CACs) in international bonds. This decision was shaped partly by Mexico's successful launch of a bond subject to New York law but featuring CACs, and by subsequent issues with similar provisions from other emerging market countries. This paper reviews the developments leading up to that event, its implications, and prospects for the future. It asks whether we can expect to see additional issuance by emerging markets of bonds featuring CACs, whether such a trend would in fact help to make the world a safer financial place, and what additional steps might be taken to further enhance modalities for crisis resolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Barry Eichengreen & Kenneth Kletzer & Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Crisis resolution: next steps," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpb:03-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wynne, Jose, 2005. "Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 47-72, September.
    2. Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013. "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 68-78.
    3. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 459-490.
    4. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2006. "Catalytic finance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 161-177, September.
    5. Andrew G Haldane & Gregor Irwin & Victoria Saporta, 2004. "Bail out or work out? theoretical considerations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(494), pages 130-148, March.
    6. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    7. Andritzky, Jochen & Christofzik, Désirée I. & Feld, Lars P. & Scheuering, Uwe, 2016. "A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area," Working Papers 04/2016, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    8. Bai, Yan & Zhang, Jing, 2012. "Duration of sovereign debt renegotiation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 252-268.
    9. Dungey, Mardi & Jacobs, Jan & Lestano, 2010. "Financial crises in Asia: concordance by asset market or country?," Working Papers 10575, University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, revised 01 Nov 2010.
    10. Marc Flandreau, Juan Flores, 2010. "Hamlet Without The Prince of Denmark: Relationship Banking and Conditionality Lending In The London Market For Foreign Government Debt, 1815 - 1913," IHEID Working Papers 08-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    11. Yue, Vivian Z., 2010. "Sovereign default and debt renegotiation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 176-187, March.
    12. Andrew G Haldane & Adrian Penalver & Victoria Saporta & Hyun Song Shin, 2005. "Optimal collective action clause thresholds," Bank of England working papers 249, Bank of England.
    13. Rui Pedro Esteves, 2007. "Quis custodiet quem? Sovereign Debt and Bondholders` Protection Before 1914," Economics Series Working Papers 323, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    14. Helmut Stix, 2004. "The Impact of ATM Transactions and Cashless Payments on Cash Demand in Austria," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1, pages 90-105.
    15. Giancarlo Corsetti & Michael P. Devereux & John Hassler & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Xavier Vives, 2011. "Chapter 2: A New Crisis Mechanism for the Euro Area," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 71-96, February.
    16. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2010. "International Government Debt," Business School Working Papers 2010-03, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    17. Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt crises: could an international court minimize them?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 142, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    18. Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Vermeidung und Bewältigung von Verschuldungskrisen: Die Rolle privater und öffentlicher Institutionen," HWWA Discussion Papers 340, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    19. Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2004. "Resolving sovereign debt crises with collective action clauses," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue feb.20.
    20. Alfredo Bardozzetti & Davide Dottori, 2013. "Collective action clauses: how do they weigh on sovereigns?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 897, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    21. Bardozzetti, Alfredo & Dottori, Davide, 2014. "Collective action clauses: How do they affect sovereign bond yields?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 286-303.
    22. Ran Bi, 2008. "“Beneficial” Delays in Debt Restructuring Negotiations," IMF Working Papers 08/38, International Monetary Fund.
    23. Itay Goldstein & Assaf Razin & Hui Tong, 2008. "Liquidity, Institutional Quality and the Composition of International Equity Outflows," NBER Working Papers 13723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Aitor Erce-Domínguez, 2006. "Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises," Working Papers 0636, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.

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    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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