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Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency and their Effect on Capital Flows

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  • Thomas, Jonathan P.

Abstract

The paper examines the main issues involved in translating domestic bankruptcy procedures to the sovereign context. It considers some of the principles by which domestic bankruptcy procedures operate, and the extent to which they apply to international lending. Two recent proposals are considered in more detail, that of Krueger (2001) and that of Pettifor (2002). The paper also considers the question of the ex ante effects of a procedure which makes default less costly, and concludes that despite a negative impact on the ability to borrow, the overall welfare effect need not be negative.
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Suggested Citation

  • Thomas, Jonathan P., 2003. "Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency and their Effect on Capital Flows," WIDER Working Paper Series 075, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2003-75
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    File URL: http://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/dp2003-075.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, 2006. "Odious Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 82-92, March.
    2. Reint Gropp & John Karl Scholz & Michelle J. White, 1997. "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 217-251.
    3. Nancy Birdsall & John Williamson, 2002. "Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 337.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Cleaning Up Third World Debt without Getting Taken to the Cleaners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 31-42, Winter.
    5. Marcus H. Miller, 2002. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts--Or No Change?," Policy Briefs PB02-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2005. "International Unions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 602-615, June.
    7. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 2002. "Resolving the Debt Crisis of Low-Income Countries," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 257-286.
    8. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Jeremy Bulow, 2002. "First World Governments and Third World Debt: A Bankruptcy Court for Sovereign Lending?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 229-256.
    10. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 2000. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 335-362, January.
    11. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    12. Raffer, Kunibert, 1990. "Applying chapter 9 insolvency to international debts: An economically efficient solution with a human face," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-311, February.
    13. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "External debt, capital flight and political risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3-4), pages 199-220, November.
    14. Michelle White, 2002. "Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 287-320.
    15. Eaton, Jonathan, 1990. "Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 43-56, Winter.
    16. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeronimo Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy Reorganization; A Survey," IMF Working Papers 02/57, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    18. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bedford, Paul & Irwin, Gregor, 2008. "Financial Stability Paper No 4: Reforming the IMF's Lending-into-Arrears Framework," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 4, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    sovereign debt; bankruptcy; capital flows; Chapter 11;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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