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Reforming the global financial system

  • Aizenman, Joshua

The global financial market has been shaken throughout the nineties by a series of major financial crises. Attempts to stabilize the global system have led to large bailouts. This system cannot survive indefinitely. The willingness of taxpayers in the industrialized (OECD) countries to engage in continuing bailouts is approaching its limits. This paper has two goals. First, it briefly summarizes the evidence that financial crises may be induced by opening up developing countries to short-term capital inflows. Second, it appraises the various proposals made for mitigating the severity of financial crises.

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Paper provided by Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, UC Santa Cruz in its series Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, Working Paper Series with number qt0cg1r6q8.

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Date of creation: 09 Apr 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:glinre:qt0cg1r6q8
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