Restoring Banking Stability: Beyond Supervised Capital Requirements
Emerging economies have been particularly prone to financial sector crises, reflecting marked information asymmetries and political interference, as well as the substantial volatility in underlying economic conditions, and the vulnerability of banking and finance when structural economic changes create a new and uncharted operating environment. The standard regulatory paradigm relies mainly on supervised capital adequacy, but it may not be enough. Other measures to improve the incentive structure for bankers, regulators, and other market participants could effectively increase the number of concerned, skilled and watchful eyes. Intermittent application of supplementary "blunt instruments" could also be useful.
Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
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