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Do Risk Premia Protect from Banking Crises

  • Hans Gersbach
  • Jan Wenzelburger

This paper studies the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic risks in banking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a competitive banking system embedded in an overlapping generation model subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully incorporate macroeconomic risks in their pricing of loans, a banking system may enter bankruptcy with probability one. A major cause for this default is that risk premia of a competitive banking system may become too small if the capital base is low.

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File URL: http://bieson.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/volltexte/2004/561/pdf/riskPrem.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000356.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000356
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