Sophistication in Risk Management, Bank Equity, and Stability
We investigate the question of whether sophistication in risk management fosters banking stability. We compare a simple banking system in which an average rating is used with a sophisticated banking system in which banks are able to assess the default risk of entrepreneurs individually. Both banking systems compete for deposits, loans, and bank equity. While a sophisticated system rewards entrepreneurs with low default risks with low loan interest rates, a simple system acquires more bank equity and finances more entrepreneurs. Expected repayments in a simple system are always higher and its default risk is lower if productivity is sufficiently high. Expected aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs, however, is higher in a sophisticated banking system.
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